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Abstract 
In France a National Objective for Health Insurance Spending (ONDAM) is annually voted by
the Parliament since 1996 and is divided into four sub-groups corresponding to a category of
care. We describe how the initial diversity in providers’ payment rules conduced to particular
regulation procedures for each of them. We then show how the failure of this initial regulating
model forced the Health Authorities to converge on a single price regulation procedure since
2000.   Preoccupation  of  the  French  Health  Authorities  is  now  to  identify  spontaneous
determinants of health care expenditures growth rate and to adjust resources to the ONDAM
level.
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Introduction 
The sharp increase of French health care expenditures dates back to the mid 1970s. Boosted
by day payments, hospital spending grew to 54.9% of overall health expenditures in 1982.
This is the reason why the Health Authorities introduced an annual, global budget for public
hospitals in 1983. It was successful in slowing hospital expenditure growth rate, which passed
from an annual average rate of 8% before 1983 to 4%  thereafter (Caussat and Fenina and
Geffroy , 2003) (Redmon and Yakoboski 1995).  
Encouraged by the effectiveness of budget regulation, the French health authorities decided to
spread  this  financing  method  to  other  health  producers.  In  the  early  1990’s,  several
agreements were signed by health care professionals with the French public health insurance
funds,  fixing an annual,  global  budget for  the  national  spending in  each category of care
(nurses, physiotherapists, private medical laboratories, private hospitals …).   Global budget
caps  were  therefore,  like  in  many other  countries,  (Poterba,  1994)  (Van  de  Ven,  1995)
(Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005) viewed as the central instrument for slowing the growth of
health spending (Hirtzlin,  2006)
This mechanism was fully completed in 1996, when the Parliament voted, for the first time, a
National  Objective  for  Health  Insurance  Spending (ONDAM).  It  is  an  annual  ceiling for
overall public health insurance expenditure (Flori and Hirtzlin, 2000). The ONDAM can be
viewed as a prospective spending limit, devoted to public health care provision (e.g. €134.9
billion  for  2005).  Out-of-pocket  and  private  insurance  payments,  representing  23.4%  of
overall  health care spending, are not included. The ONDAM target level of one year was
based on spending in an initial (or base) year (i.e. 1996) and an estimated growth for health
care expenditure, including the changes in the costs of inputs used to produce health care (in
practice this was essentially growth in salaries paid in public hospitals) plus expenditures that
result from changes in laws and regulation.  Once the overall budget is set, it is divided into
four sub-groups representing categories of spending: outpatient care (i.e. general practitioners,
specialists, nurses, drug delivery, dentists, and physiotherapists), public hospitals (divided in
22 regional sub-budgets),  private for-profit  hospitals and care for handicapped and elderly
people.   Each  of  the  sub-groups  has  its  own  target  level  and,  for  outpatient  care,  each
professional  category has  to  adjust  its  spending  to  its  target  level.   A different  spending
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growth rate is  attributed to each sub-group, by considering if  the sub-group exceeded the
target the year before or not, and by evaluating new public health objectives
The aim of this paper is to highlight the diversity of payment rules initially adopted in 1996
for each category of provider in order to stay under its sub-group target (section 1). Section 2
shows why the initial payment rules were abandoned in 2000 to converge on a unique price
adjustment rule derived from Germany’s approach. In Section 3, we discuss the opportunity to
calculate the ONDAM level as a sustainable growth rate for health spending. 
1- The initial diversity in providers’ regulation rules   
Let us consider that a global sub-budget (B) is allocated for year t to one type of providers.  
Global budgeting for public hospitals is dating from 1983 and was not modified under the
ONDAM process. Volume and price were lumped together to calculate the annual prospective
budget.  The  payment  rule  implemented  for  public  hospitals  was  based  on  a  monthly
prospective budget. Each month (j=1 to 12) one-twelfth of its budget (b) was paid to each
hospital. Thus, if an overall hospital budget of size B is allocated for one year t to n hospitals;
their payment rule can be summarized by the Equation 1 below: 
(Equation 1)      ∑ ∑
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For outpatient providers and private hospitals the adequate regulation tool to stay under the
sub-budget limit was more difficult to find. They are self employed and strongly attached to
fee-for-service payments. Patients pay producers and are partially reimbursed by the statutory
Health  Insurance  system.  As  fee-for-service  was  maintained  within  the  ONDAM,  the
compatibility with the annual  budget limit  could not be reached by means of budget plus
prospective payment mechanism (thanks to capitation payments for example). So it had to be
ensured by other regulative procedures. 
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To simplify, let us assume that there is one price (p) and one activity measured by a volume
(q).  Some  health  care  providers  have  negotiated  a  pay-back  agreement  which  can  be
summarised in Equation 2 below: 
(Equation 2)  ∑∑
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As they receive fees-for-service, providers’ overall expenditures are calculated by multiplying
price (p) by volume (q). The equilibrium with Bt was obtained through a reimbursement r. If
spending was under the budget limit, the reimbursement went to providers. a was a negotiated
coefficient between 0 and 1. When a is less than 1 and when r >0, the equilibrium with Bt is
not possible. 
Physicians and medical laboratories had initially adopted this agreement.  The pharmaceutical
industry had negotiated a level for a which was far below 1. 
Other  health  care  providers  had negotiated  a  pricing update  mechanism that  incorporated
spending targets. Fees were adjusted upwards or downwards depending on whether t spending
had fallen below, or exceeded the budget. Thus the equilibrium should be considered for a 2
year minimum period as shown in Equation 3. 
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If the global budget (Bt  + Bt+1 ) was not reached after two years, fees (i.e. Pt+2  to Pt+n ) went
down and so on. Thus p could tend to zero if the global budget was always exceeded. This
rule was applied to nurses, physiotherapists, dentists, private hospitals and social health care.
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2-Converging on a single price regulation procedure  
All these providers’ payment rules within the ONDAM were implemented for the first time in
1997.  The system was  considered  as  a  success  because  overall  public  health  expenditure
(€89.32 billion) was under the global budget cap (€89.45 billion). By applying the pay-back
agreement shown in Equation 2, the public health insurance reimbursed €1372 to each general
practitioner,  because  their  expenditures  was  under  the  global  sub-budget  which  had  been
allocated to them. Specialists,  who exceeded their  sub-budget  for 1997, negotiated a  new
reimbursement procedure summarized in equation 4:   
(Equation 4)      1,1,*1,1
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This meant that specialists got a global budget for year t+1 which was reduced by the amount
they were supposed to reimburse in year t.  
The initial success was quickly interrupted in 1998. Spending by physicians exceeded their
global budget and they refused to reimburse the Public Health Insurance.  Physicians even
turned against the Health Insurance system, by bring legal action before the Council of State
and before the Constitution Council to denounce reimbursement agreements. These judicial
bodies ruled in the physicians’ favour. They motivated their decision by the illegality of the
reimbursement procedure (Evin, 2002). Physicians were considered as collectively responsible
and had to pay a fixed amount in proportion of the overall  exceeding; so everyone in the
group was punished for what could be interpreted as the excesses of only some of them. This
was considered as incompatible with the French constitutional principles.  
Thus, the government modified the rules for outpatient professionals. It adopted a single price
regulation method for all of them. But because price regulation shown in Equation 3 had very
little chance of being compatible with the global budget, when fee adjustment was applied the
year after the excess, France used a floating price mechanism from 2000 to 2002 which was
inspired  by  Germany  (Benstetter  and  Wambach,  2006)  and  that  can  be  summarized  in
Equation 5. 
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In 1993, Germany implemented health care reform legislation which strengthened the global
budgeting of physicians. German physician expenditure was capped, thanks to a point-system.
At the end of each quarter, the global budget for all physicians is divided by the sum of points
submitted by all physicians for reimbursement. This determines the point (price) value pt. 
In France, price regulation was supposed to be more efficient if a way could be found to adjust
prices level immediately to global spending. Fees were supposed to be revised twice a year (in
April and September) according to the spending level that was reached. Unfortunately, the
public health insurance system was not able to proceed to price adjustment so quickly, due to
uncertainty in statistical data about real spending. 
If the mechanism had been strictly applied, price regulation would have been compatible with
global budget. Nevertheless, if volumes of care are steadily increasing, the point value drops
and there is a risk of physicians’ bankruptcy, because pt could be nearly equal to zero. This
problem could be solved if physicians are guaranteed that the fee value could not fall below a
pre-determined value (Benstetter and Wambach, 2006). 
In  France,  price  flexibility  was  moderated  by  providers’  negotiations.  Fees  were  not
automatically reduced  when  expenditures  exceeded  this  target.  So  regulation  through  the
ONDAM target and global sub-budgets progressively lost its utility. The ONDAM was no
longer  considered  as  a  regulatory device  and  had  become  a  simple  tool  for  health  care
expenditure forecasting (Evin, 2000). The consequence was that the government progressively
lost  control  on  health  care  spending.  The  average  annual  health  expenditure  growth  rate
accelerated, passing from 2.8% during 1996-1999 period, to 6.1% during 2000-2002 period
(Hirtzlin, 2003).  
A renewed soft regulation process based on “mutual confidence” emerged in 2002 and is still
in use in 2006. The public Health Insurance authorities sit down with producers to adopt a
regulatory approach that is acceptable to them. Contract terms usually balance an upper level
for fees with changes in prescription patterns (e.g. less drug prescriptions, less home visits by
physicians etc.). Determining budgets is no longer a matter of choosing quantitative criteria
and applying financial penalties but a matter of interaction between public health insurance
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and  stakeholders.  Thus  physicians  are  supposed  to  adopt  self-regulation  and  virtuous
behaviour. But whatever the merits of a regulatory procedure based on ethical codes and good
professional practices, it is doubtful it will be successful without introducing an efficient tool
to  regulate  the  overall  spending.  Historically,  physician  self-regulation  has  not  been
particularly successful  in  controlling the behaviour  of individual  physicians  nor in  France
neither  in  other  countries  (Jacobson,  2001).  Indeed,  there  is  no  substantial  evidence  of
physicians’ ability to respect their contract, even on key points (e.g. generic drug prescriptions
are still lower than the level recommended in the agreement). 
Rather than just finding tools for regulating finance, the major preoccupation of the French
Health Authorities since 2003 has been to identify determinants of health care expenditures
growth rate.     
3- Determining a sustainable growth rate for the ONDAM   
Sustainability of the ONDAM level  was only be assessed in  France,  in 2003. The Health
Minister ordered a report in 2003 (Coulomb, 2001) to determine what data are actually linked
to health care expenditure growth.  Several  indicators were identified.   First,  demographic
factors are explaining one percentage point of the health care expenditure growth rate (i.e.
0.46 percentage points due to French population growth, and 0.54 percentage points due to
ageing).  Technical  progress  is  responsible  for  1.5  percentage  points,  and  health  care
expenditures are assumed also to be linked to the GDP growth rate. Finally, other data may
explain  annual  fluctuations,  such  as  an  epidemics,  changes  in  social  behaviours,  health
reforms etc. The report concluded that the ONDAM growth rate should be adjusted to these
parameters: that meant an increasing of health care expenditures of 4 to 6% per year.  
This method is very similar to the Sustainable Growth Rate calculation used by Medicare for
physicians’ fee payments in the United States (GAO, 2005) (GAO, 2002). The Sustainable
Growth Rate system was created in the United States by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Its
objective is to moderate spending of Medicare, the Federally financed program for the elderly.
Over time, the SGR system has been revised but its main principle remains. When physician
services  exceed  a  pre-defined  spending  target,  fee  updates  are  reduced.   Thus  spending
increases caused by volume are corrected by fee moderation. The SGR is the product of the
estimated percentage change in four elements: (1) input prices for physician services, (2) the
average number of Medicare beneficiaries in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) program, (3)
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National economic output,  as measured by inflation-adjusted GDP per capita (4) expected
expenditures for physician services resulting from changes in Laws or Regulation. 
The advantage of these formulas is to introduce explicitly a volume indicator (beneficiary
numbers) and to compensate growth of production costs for physicians instead of implicitly
adjusting fees to public hospitals wage growth rate which has no link to outpatient services
constraints.  The  method  also  has  the  advantage  of  recognising that  health  care provision
should be compatible with the GDP per capita growth rate.  As health care is  financed in
France by taxes on the gross national revenue, this is a coherent way to link health spending
growth to the overall wealth of the country. Nevertheless a question still remains unsolved. As
physicians consider that demand is increasing more quickly than the GDP growth rate, the
SGR system's allowance should be increased regularly.  
Conclusion
Although the global budget was supposed to be an efficient tool to restrict public health care
expenditures  in  France,  outpatient  regulation  has  failed.  Governmental  control  over
physicians’ overall spending and activity has been rejected and outpatient activity has been
very lightly regulated since 2002. Up to now, the health authorities have officially maintained
the  ONDAM  as  a  target  but  its  growth  rate  is  now  calculated  by  considering  multiple
pressures (from patients and producers) existing on public health care spending. 
Price flexibility is still presented as the main regulatory tool. The price role has even been
introduced for public hospitals. Per case payments through Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG)
classification have progressively been replacing hospitals’ global budgets since 2005. From
now on, if all public hospitals exceed the overall sub-budget devoted to hospital activities,
DRG unit prices will be reduced in the following year (Cash, 2004)
So the  regulator  must  deal  with  the  issue  of  whether  future  health  care  can  be  publicly
financed. Two options are possible: 1) increasing taxes and accepting that health care will be a
major part of public finances in the future. A French Senate report (Vasselle, 2003) has shown
that if there is a two point gap between the growth rate of GDP and heath care costs then
public health care expenditures will represent 16% of the GDP in 2040.  2) Reducing the
package of care which is financed through public funds. For example, France is cutting the list
of drugs that  are reimbursed within the ONDAM. The latest  health care reform in 2004,
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combines these two options, but direct regulation of producers using global budgets and strict
financial constraints has been definitively abandoned. 
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